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Abstract
Despite the huge success of Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) in a wide spectrum of machine learning and data
mining tasks, recent research shows that this powerful tool
is susceptible to maliciously crafted adversarial examples.
Up until now, adversarial training has been the most suc-
cessful defense against adversarial attacks. To increase ad-
versarial robustness, a DNN can be trained with a com-
bination of benign and adversarial examples generated by
first-order methods. However, in state-of-the-art first-order
attacks, adversarial examples with sign gradients retain the
sign information of each gradient component but discard
the relative magnitude between components. In this work,
we replace sign gradients with quantized gradients. Gradi-
ent quantization not only preserves the sign information, but
also keeps the relative magnitude between components. Ex-
periments show white-box first-order attacks with quantized
gradients outperform their variants with sign gradients on
multiple datasets. Notably, our BLOB QG attack achieves
an accuracy of 88.32% on the secret MNIST model from the
MNIST Challenge and it outperforms all other methods on
the leaderboard of white-box attacks.
1. Introduction
Although Deep Neural Networks (DNN) are powerful
tools in a wide range of applications, they are vulnerable
to adversarial examples, which are crafted by adding small
perturbations to benign examples [20]. Perturbations are so
small that they are undetected by a human observer while
they confuse well-trained DNNs to make wrong predic-
tions, see Figure 1. Consequently, the lack of robustness
of DNNs has raised significant concerns for safety in criti-
cal technologies such as autonomous driving and malware
prevention [18, 6].
One approach to increase adversarial robustness of
DNNs is to train the model with data augumented by adver-
sarial examples. In particular, [13] suggests the following
Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) as the objective:
min
θ
ρ(θ)
where ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
] (1)
Where θ denotes the parameters of DNNs, data exam-
ples x with labels y are from the data distribution D and
L(θ, x, y) is the loss function of DNN. S is a set of al-
lowed perturbations for crafting adversarial examples. In
this paper, we consider the well studied `∞ perturbations,
i.e., given some small threshold , we have ‖δ‖∞ ≤  and
it implies small visible changes in images for each pixel.
Most of the first-order attacks used for adversarial training
are crafted under `∞ perturbations. Solving the inner max-
imization problem equals to finding adversarial examples
that the neural network fails to classify correctly while the
outer minimization problem tends to increase the robustness
against such adversaries.
Raw Gradients To solve the inner maximization prob-
lem of ERM in Eq. 1, one class of approach uses first-
order methods to compute the perturbation δ and generate
the adversarial example x + δ. However, raw gradients
∇xL(θ, x, y) cannot be directly applied to images x, be-
cause magnitudes of raw gradients are at a different scale to
the image pixels. For example, for the MNIST dataset, most
components of raw gradients concentrate at values ranging
from 10−5 to 10−4, while the pixel value of MNIST images
belongs to the set {0, 1/256, . . . , 1}.
Sign Gradients To make use of raw gradients and ap-
ply them to pixel values, reseachers consider taking the
sign of each raw gradient. In particular, the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [7] linearizes the inner maximization
problem with
Figure 1. Perturbed MNIST by PQGD
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xFGSM = x+  · sgn(∇L(θ, x, y)) (2)
Note that sgn(∇L(θ, x, y)) takes the sign of gradi-
ents ∇L(θ, x, y), i.e., gradient values belong to the set of
{−1, 1}. A more sophisticated approach to generate adver-
sarial examples is to use multi-step FGSM with a smaller
step size α, e.g., Iterative FGSM [11] and Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD) attack [13]. Evidence in [13] has shown
that the PGD attack is the universal first-order adversary.
Quantized Gradient One limitation of sign gradients is
that it discards the relative magnitude between each compo-
nent of the raw gradient. When a component of raw gradient
has its absolute value much larger than another component,
it plays a more important role in solving the inner maxi-
mization problem. However, sign gradients only make the
two components share the same absolute value of 1. Be-
cause a smaller step size α is used to generate adversarial
examples, we consider taking gradient values from a wider
range of integers than {−1, 1}. Inspired by the success of
quantized gradients [1] in distributed optimization, we in-
troduce Quantized Gradients in first-order attacks to pre-
serve the relative magnitude. Not only do quantized gra-
dients retain the sign of each component, they also round
each component to an integer proportional to its magnitude
to preserve the relative magnitude. See Table 1 for the com-
parison between raw gradients, sign gradients and quantized
gradients.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce generalized quantized gradients which
can replace the sign gradients in existing first or-
der attacks. Specifically, in this paper, we propose
Projected Quantized Gradients Descent (PQGD) and
DAA-BLOB with quantized gradients (BLOB QG) as
extensions of state-of-the-art first-order attacks PGD
and DAA-BLOB.
• We show that PQGD and BLOB QG are sharper at-
tacks than PGD and DAA-BLOB, respectively, on
multiple datasets. In particular, BLOB QG achieves
an accuracy of 88.32% on the secret MNIST model
of the MNIST challenge and it outperforms all other
methods on the leaderboard of white-box attacks. See
Section 4.2.
• We study the effect of maximum allowed perturba-
tion and number of steps on PQGD. Particularly,
when maximum allowed perturbation is larger or step
number is smaller, adversarial examples generated by
PQGD are sharper than PGD. See details in Section
4.3 and 4.4.
• Our technique is simple to implement as it only re-
quires tuning a single hyperparameter b.
2. Preliminaries
Given an L−class neural network classifier f : Rd →
RL, for each d−dimensional data example x and its corre-
sponding ground truth label y, a f is trained to match the
predicted label yˆ = arg maxk fk(x) with the true label y
where fk(x) is the kth component of f(x). To attack a well-
trained classifier, an adversarial example xadv is crafted so
that yˆadv 6= yˆ where yˆadv = arg maxk fk(xadv) given per-
turbations ‖xadv − x‖∞ ≤ .
Attacks can be divided into two main categories as sum-
marized below:
• Targeted Attack and Untargeted Attack By specify-
ing a label y′ 6= yˆ, an adversarial example xadv is gen-
erated with its predicted label yˆadv = y′ under the `∞
constraint. It is known as the targeted attack. On the
other hand, an untargeted attack only requires yˆadv to
be any label except yˆ.
• White-box Attack and Black-box Attack If the at-
tack has access to all information of the network and
training dataset, it is known as the white-box attack.
FGSM and PGD attacks belong to this category be-
cause gradients are computed from network parame-
ters and dataset. In contrast, the capability of attackers
is more restricted in the black-box attack setting. In
this scenario, attackers do not know the network pa-
rameters and network architecture, also access to any
large training dataset is forbidden. See [14, 15] for a
detailed description of black-box attacks.
In this paper, we consider white-box untargeted attacks
under `∞ perturbations. We now present a state-of-the-art
first-order attack known as Projected Gradient Descent at-
tack.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [13] is shown to be
the universal first-order adversary. That is, a neural network
trained with adversarial examples crafted using PGD is ro-
bust to any first-order attack. Given a chosen parameter α, a
training example x and its label y, PGD is similar to the It-
erative FGSM attack [11] and applies the following updates
at iteration t :
x(t+1) = Πclip(x
(t) + α · sgn(∇L(θ, x(t), y))) (3)
Note that PGD is different from iterative FGSM in that
x0 is randomly perturbed in the vicinity of x, while iterative
FGSM has x0 = x. On the other hand, FGSM uses  as
the step size while PGD uses α where α is much smaller
than  in practice. For example, to craft MNIST adversarial
examples, one has  = 0.3 and α = 0.01.
3. Proposed Method
In this section, we extend first-order attacks with quan-
tized gradients.
Gradient Scheme Applicable on Pixels Sign Preservation Relative Magnitude Preservation
Raw Gradients 7 3 3
Sign Gradients 3 3 7
Quantized Gradients 3 3 3
Table 1. Comparison of different gradient schemes
3.1. Motivation
Because of the `∞ constraint on the perturbation, each
component of the perturbation is valid to take any value
from the interval of [−, ]. Using the sign gradient al-
lows the perturbation at each iteration to take values from
the set {−α,+α}. One challenge in PGD attacks is to de-
termine other valid perturbations in each iteration leads to
better attack. We seek for a solution to the problem. Note
that existing works attempt to craft first-order attacks with
sign gradients, so the absolute value of the perturbation at
each iteration is equal to the step size α. Our research uses
different perturbation values for each component to craft a
shaper attack, for this reason our work is orthogonal to ex-
isting research on first-order attacks.
We first introduce the technique of gradient quantization
and propose a generalized gradient quantization to show
that existing sign gradient attack can be replaced with the
quantized gradient. We inspect the distribution of perturba-
tion values of quantized gradients, sign gradients and raw
gradients. Finally, we analyze the time complexity of our
approach compared with vanilla sign gradients.
3.2. Gradient Quantization
Our approach attempts to preserve the relative magni-
tude between each component in the raw gradient while it
is still applicable on pixel value as shown in Table 1. Given
a positive integer hyperparameter b, data example x and its
corresponding label y, the loss function L and network pa-
rameters θ, we calculate quantized gradient qg as follows:
1. Calculate the gradient of loss function g =
∇xL(θ, x, y)
2. Take the max value of components in the gradient
M = maxi|gi|
3. Return the quantized gradient qg = ζ(b · g/M)
.
Where function ζ(·) aims to round each component to its
nearest integer except when the absolute value of the com-
ponent is less than 1. Specifically, it takes the following
form:
ζ(vi) =
{
sgn(vi) if |vi| < 1,
round(vi) otherwise.
(4)
The ζ function enforces each component of qg to be
non-zero integer. Function round(vi) rounds vi to its near-
est integer.
Relationship to Sign Gradients In the special case
where b = 1, quantized gradient qg degenerates to sign gra-
dient which is used in the current FGSM and PGD frame-
work.
Note that only one hyperparameter b needs to be tuned
when computing the quantized gradient qg. When b is set
to a large integer, the relative magnitude between each com-
ponent of the raw gradient is preserved. Each component
of the perturbation is rescaled to an integer belonging to
[−b, b].
Indeed, gradient quantization is equivalent to finding a
scheme to assign different step size to each component of
the perturbation. We later show this method of assignment
helps to craft more effective adversarial examples, where
fewer iterations are needed to generate sharper adversarial
examples than sign gradients. For adversarial training, it
is too expensive to augument adversarial examples which
needs many iterations to generate. If adversarial examples
of similar effectiveness can be generated using fewer itera-
tions, adversarial training can benefit from such examples.
Connection to QSGD We briefly review how quan-
tized gradients are used in distributed optimization. In
distributed optimization, one of the bottlenecks in perfor-
mance is the limited bandwidth required to collect gradi-
ents from several parallel machines. Quantized Stochastic
Gradient Descent (QSGD)[1] is proposed to conserve the
bandwidth with a good convergence gurantee. To be spe-
cific, each component of the gradient is quantized and ran-
domly rounded to a discrete set of values. Given any gradi-
ent v ∈ Rd and a hyperparameter s, the quantized gradient
Qs(v) is defined as:
Qs(vi) = ‖v‖2 · sgn(vi) · ξi(v, s) (5)
Given some positive integer l such that |vi| /‖v‖2 ∈[
l/s, (l + 1)/s
]
, ξi(v, s) is given by
ξi(v, s) =
{
l/s with probability p
(l + 1)/s otherwise
(6)
where p = 1 − ( |vi|‖v‖2 · s − l). Experiments show that
QSGD significantly outperforms its full-precision variant in
terms of convergence speed.
Although quantized gradients used in attacks bear some
resemblance to QSGD, there are a few differences between
the two quantization techniques.
• QSGD is a randomized approach whereas our method
is deterministic. In particular, QSGD randomly rounds
every component to the nearest floor integer or ceiling
integer, while our approach rounds every component
using the deterministic function ζ(·).
• QSGD uses `2-norm of the gradient to divide each
component. On the other hand, we enforce the `∞
constraint on the perturbation. So we use ‖g‖∞ =
maxi|gi| to divide each component.
• QSGD has its component Qs(vi) ∈ [0, 1], while our
approach constrains each component of qg as any non-
zero integer.
3.3. Generalized Gradient Quantization
Here, we introduce generalized gradient quantization for
first-order attacks.
Recall that at each iteration PGD update has the form of
Eq. 3. To integrate quantized gradients with PGD, we re-
place the sign gradient sgn(∇xL(θ, x, y)) with qg. It takes
the following form:
x(t+1) = Πclip(x
(t) + α · qg) (7)
We name our approach Projected Quantized Gradient
Descent (PQGD). To facilitate other existing first-order at-
tacks with sign gradients, i.e., for attacks with the form
x(t+1) = Πclip(x
(t)+α·sgn(·)), we replace sgn(·) with the
quantized gradients to improve the effectiveness of attacks.
We call this approach generalized gradient quantization.
Distributionally Adversarial Attack (DAA) is an exam-
ple of a state-of-the-art first-order white-box attack, which
appears on the leaderboard of the MNIST challenge. While
DAA is proposed to solve the optimal adversarial data dis-
tribution [25], PGD views each data example independently.
DAA is interpreted as Wasserstein Gradient Flows, and the
update of DAA using the Lagranigian Blob Method (DAA-
BLOB) at iteration t is given as:
eg = ∇
x
(t)
i
L(θ, x
(t)
i , yi)+
c
M
[ M∑
j=1
K(x
(t)
i , x
(t)
j )∇x(t)j L(θ, x
(t)
j , yj)+
∇
x
(t)
j
K(x
(t)
i , x
(t)
j )
]
(8)
x
(t+1)
i = Πclip(x
(t)
i + α · sgn(eg) (9)
where K(·, ·) is a kernel function. We define the follow-
ing quantized gradient for DAA-BLOB.
eqg = ζ(b · eg/Meg) where Meg = max
i
|egi|. (10)
DAA-BLOB with quantized gradient (BLOB QG) has the
following update in each iteration:
x(t+1) = Πclip(x
(t) + α · eqg) (11)
We name this approach DAA-BLOB with quantized gra-
dient (BLOB QG).
3.4. Inspection of Quantized Gradient
We plot the histogram of sign gradients, raw gradients
and quantized gradients of the adversarial trained MNIST
model with various values of b (Fig. 2). Recall that an it-
erative attack has a projection operation at the end of each
iteration. Therefore, the value change of each gradient com-
ponent should be within the range of [−/α, /α]. Using
MNIST as an example, we have a maximum allowed per-
turbation of  = 0.3 and the learning rate of α = 0.01,
so for the absolute value of gradient component larger than

α = 30, the value will be clipped inside the range of
[−30, 30].
Figure 2(a) shows the histogram of the sign gradient,
which is used in PGD and other first-order attacks. Values
of components of sign gradients concentrate on {−1, 1} be-
cause only the sign of each component is preserved. In Fig-
ure 2(b) to Figure 2(e), quantized gradients are spread out
on the range of [−30, 30] and have a shape similar to the
raw gradients shown in Figure 2(f). Not only is the sign of
each component kept for quantized gradients, but the rela-
tive magnitude between each component is preserved.
Recall that we use function ζ(·) to constrain each gra-
dient component as non-zero integers. Thus, if we do not
apply the constraint, most of the gradient components will
have a value of 0. Accordingly these components do not
contribute to the crafting of adversarial examples. There-
fore we enforce the components to be non-zero integers
and they are restricted to the range {−1, 1}, whose count
dominates count of the other integer values within the range
[−30, 30] as shown in Figure 2.
3.5. Complexity Analysis
We analyze the computational complexity of the quan-
tized gradient here. Compared with vanilla gradients
∇xL(θ, x, y) has a time complexity of at least O(d) where
d is the dimension of data point x. Since computing the
maximum M and applying the function ζ takes time of
O(d). Because of this, computing the quantized gradient
shares the same time complexity as computing the raw gra-
dient. Therefore, our technique introduces low computa-
tional overheads.
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Figure 2. Histograms of sign gradients, raw gradient and quantized gradients of MNIST model with various values of b.
In addition, our approach of gradient quantization is easy
to implement. For instance, in our python implementation,
we use around 10 lines of code.
4. Experiment
The purpose of our experiment is to test the effective-
ness of existing first-order attacks with quantized gradi-
ent (PQGD and BLOB QG) on adversarial trained models
compared to the attacks with sign gradients, e.g., PGD and
DAA-BLOB.
4.1. Experiment Settings
Our code is based on the implementation of PGD and
DAA-BLOB. The code of PGD can be found at code site
and the implementation of DAA-BLOB can be found at
code site. We use PGD, DAA-BLOB, Interval Attacks [22]
and Surrogate attack [8] as the baselines in our experiment.
We compare our methods and baseline on the fol-
lowing datasets: MNIST [12], Cifar10[10], and Fashion-
MNIST[23]. We mirror the architecture for MNIST and
Cifar10 from the architecture used in [13] while we use
the same architecture for Fashion-MNIST as that in [25].
We use default training configurations including batch size,
learning rate and optimization settings. Cross entropy loss
is used in all of our experiments.
Practical Issues Since PGD and DAA-BLOB use ran-
domly perturbed data examples to craft adversarial exam-
ples, adversarial examples generated in different runs are
not exactly the same. An approach to take advantage of all
different runs is to merge various adversarial examples that
are misclassified by the classifier during different restarts.
4.2. Empirical Results
MNIST We present the result of comparisons between
our approach and baseline attacks on secret MNIST model
in Tables 2 and 3. The secret MNIST model is taken from
the Madry Lab’s MNIST-Challenge competition. We test
attacks with quantized gradients with various values of b.
In Table 2, we compute the worst accuracy and average
accuracy of five independent runs under a 200-step attack
for each approach on the secret MNIST model. It shows re-
sults consistent with experiments from previous works [25]
where DAA-BLOB outperforms PGD. Replacing sign gra-
dients with quantized gradients boosts the performance of
PGD and DAA-BLOB. Specifically, using quantized gra-
dients in PGD decreases the worst accuracy of the secret
MNIST model from 92.56% to 92.17% while using quan-
tized gradients in DAA-BLOB decreases the worst accuracy
from 90.48% to 90.07%.
We compare BLOB QG with state-of-the-art methods
appearing on the leaderboard of the MNIST challenge.
Our BLOB QG approach with b = 200 and 100 restarts
achieves a worst accuracy of 88.32% and outperforms all
other methods on the leaderboard of white-box attacks (In
Table 3).
Fashion-MNIST We compare PQGD and BLOB-QG
with baseline attacks on an adversarial trained Fashion-
MNIST model in Tables 4 and 5. The adversarial Fashion-
MNIST model is trained with adversarial examples gener-
ated by a 40-step PGD attack.
We observe results of Fashion-MNIST, which are consis-
tent with those of MNIST. Existing attacks with quantized
gradients create sharper attacks than those with sign gradi-
PGD PQGD 100 PQGD 200 BLOB BLOB QG 100 BLOB QG 200
Worst Avg Worst Avg Worst Avg Worst Avg Worst Avg Worst Avg
92.56% 92.79% 92.27% 92.37% 92.17% 92.33% 90.48% 90.56% 90.07% 90.18% 90.08% 90.15%
Table 2. Performance Comparison of MIT MadryLab’s secret MNIST model without restart under 200-step attacks (0.3/1.0 `∞ pertur-
bations). PQGD 100 denotes PQGD with b = 100. BLOB is the DAA-BLOB approach. BLOB QG 100 denotes DAA-BLOB with
quantized gradients and b = 100.
PGD Interval Attack BLOB Surrogate BLOB QG 100 BLOB QG 200 BLOB QG 200 (100 runs)
89.49% 88.42% 88.56% 88.36% 88.40% 88.35% 88.32%
Table 3. Empirical worst-case accuracy of MIT MadryLab’s secret MNIST model under 200-step attacks (0.3/1.0 `∞ perturbations). In
the last entry, we have BLOB QG with 100 restarts. All other approaches are with 50 restarts. BLOB is the DAA-BLOB approach.
BLOB QG 100 denotes DAA-BLOB with quantized gradients and b = 100.
ents.
Cifar10 We compare the performance of adversarial
examples generated by PGD and PQGD on the adversar-
ial trained Cifar10 model from the Madry Lab (in Table 6).
We test a single run of 100-step attacks of PGD and PQGD
under 8.0/255.0 and 16.0/255.0 `∞ maximum allowed per-
turbations.
As shown in Table 6, for a maximum allowed perturba-
tion of 8.0/255.0. PQGD with b = 100, 200, 500 achieves
a similar performance to PGD. However, PQGD with b =
1000 produces a worse result than PGD with an accuracy
of 45.57%. On the other hand, for maximum allowed per-
turbations of 16.0/255.0, PQGD decreases the accuracy of
adversarial trained models from 14.02% to 13.87%. Inter-
estingly, PQGD with b = 1000 outperforms PGD under the
`∞ maximum allowed perturbation of 16.0/255.0 whereas
PGD outperforms PQGD under the maximum allowed per-
turbation of 8.0/255.0.
4.3. Effect Of Maximum Allowed Perturbation On
Gradient Quantization
We plot the average accuracy of five independent runs of
100-step PQGD and PGD with different maximum allowed
perturbations on the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST dataset
(Fig. 3).
The effect of maximum allowed perturbations on the per-
formance of gradient quantization on the MNIST dataset is
shown in Figure 3(a). Here we test PGD and PQGD on an
adversarial trained MNIST model. The results show that
when maximum allowed perturbation is small, i.e., 0.1/1.0
`∞ perturbation, PGD and PQGD with various b achieve
similar accuracy on the adversarial trained MNIST model.
When maximum allowed perturbation increases, PQGD
with various b is sharper than PGD. Consequently, when
the maximum allowed perturbation is sufficiently large, i.e.,
0.3/1.0 `∞ perturbation, PQGD with several choices of b
outperforms PGD by a small margin.
The effect of the maximum allowed perturbation on the
performance of the gradient quantization on the Fashion-
MNIST dataset (Fig.3(b)). For the Fashion-MNIST dataset,
we obtain a similar outcome to the MNIST dataset. Specifi-
cally, PQGD with different b outperforms PGD for all max-
imum allowed `∞ perturbations ranging from 0.1/1.0 to
0.2/1.0.
We conclude that when the maximum allowed perturba-
tion is small, PQGD achieves comparable performance as
PGD, as demonstrated in the results of Figure 3 and Ta-
ble 6. In contrast when the maximum allowed perturbation
increases, PQGD creates a sharper attack than PGD. There-
fore, gradient quantization is more effective when the max-
imum allowed perturbation is larger.
4.4. Effect Of NumberOf Steps OnGradient Quan-
tization
We plot the average accuracy of five independent runs
of PQGD and PGD, with different steps on the MNIST
and Fashion-MNIST dataset (Fig. 4). Specifically, we test
PQGD and PGD under a 0.3/1.0 `∞ maximum allowed per-
turbation on the adversarial trained MNIST model while we
test approaches under a 0.2/1.0 `∞ maximum allowed per-
turbation on the adversarial trained Fashion-MNIST model.
As shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), PQGD outperforms
PGD with each choice of b and for every number of steps
ranging from 20 to 100. Interestingly, PQGD produces a
much sharper attack than PGD when number of steps is
small, e.g., 20 steps. It verifies our pervious claim that quan-
tized gradients make use of the relative magnitude to boost
the efficiency of crafting adversarial examples.
In the MNIST dataset, PQGD with b = 1000 achieves
an average accuracy of 88.89% on our adversarial trained
MNIST model while PGD reaches an average accuracy of
94.26% when number of steps is 20. PGD produces similar
performance results to PQGD at step 20, when the number
of steps increases to 60. In the Fashion-MNIST dataset, we
observe similar effects of number of steps on the perfor-
mance of PQGD. When the number of steps is fixed to 20,
PGD PQGD 100 PQGD 200 BLOB BLOB QG 100 BLOB QG 200
Worst Avg Worst Avg Worst Avg Worst Avg Worst Avg Worst Avg
71.11% 71.21% 70.79% 70.85% 70.66% 70.75% 67.90% 67.98% 67.33% 67.45% 67.30% 67.39%
Table 4. Performance Comparison of the adversarial trained Fashion-MNIST model without restart under 100-step attacks (0.2/1.0 `∞
perturbations). PQGD 100 denotes PQGD with b = 100. BLOB is the DAA-BLOB approach. BLOB QG 100 denotes DAA-BLOB with
quantized gradients and b = 100.
BLOB BLOB QG 100 BLOB QG 200 BLOB QG 500 BLOB QG 1000
66.24% 65.78% 65.69% 65.61% 65.64%
Table 5. Empirical worst-case accuracy of the adversarial trained Fashion-MNIST model under 200-step attacks with 10 restarts (0.2/1.0
`∞ perturbations). BLOB is the DAA-BLOB approach. BLOB QG 100 denotes DAA-BLOB with quantized gradients and b = 100.
PQGD with b = 500 has an average accuracy of 72.68% on
the adversarial trained Fashion-MNIST model, while PGD
has an averaged accuracy of 75.27%.
Figure 5 shows the effects of the number of steps on the
performance of PQGD and PGD on the adversarial trained
Cifar10 model from the Madry lab under `∞ allowed pertur-
bations of 8.0/255.0 and 16.0/255.0. Under both allowed
perturbations, PQGD performs better than PGD when num-
ber of steps is small, which is consistent with the result of
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets.
When the number of steps is 10, under 8.0/255.0 `∞
allowed perturbation, PQGD with b = 1000 achieves an ac-
curacy of 46.68% on the adversarial trained Cifar10 model,
while PGD has an accuracy of 47.3%. On the other hand,
under 16.0/255.0 `∞ allowed perturbation, PQGD with
b = 1000 has an accuracy of 24.91% on the adversar-
ial trained Cifar10 model, while PGD has an accuracy of
28.98%.
As the number of steps increases, the advantage of
PQGD decreases compared with PGD. When the step num-
ber increases to 40, PQGD and PGD demonstrate a similar
performance on the adversarial trained Cifar10 model.
4.5. Choice of Hyperparameter b
The only hyperparameter we need to tune in our ap-
proach is b. We test PQGD and BLOB QG with a wide
spectrum of b. In previous sections, we only present part of
results because of the space constraint. We observe that on
each dataset for small b, i.e. b < 100, attacks with quan-
tized gradients exhibit limited improvement over their sign
gradients. When b is moderate, i.e., 100 ≤ b ≤ 1000, gradi-
ent quantization achieves the best performance. Therefore
we present results when b = 100, 200, 500 and 1000 in pre-
vious sections. When b is sufficiently large, i.e.,b > 1000,
attacks with quantized gradients gain advantage when the
step size is small (Fig. 4 and 5). However when step num-
ber increases, the accuracy of attacks saturates at a relatively
high level, and it will sometimes performs even worse than
the vanilla PGD and DAA-BLOB approach.
5. Related Works
White-box Attack: Recall the definition of the white-
box attack where the attacker has complete access to the
underlying classifier information, including network archi-
tecture and parameters, training data and labels, even the
defense mechanism deployed by the underlying system.
One of the earliest white-box attacks is FGSM[7], which
is used to show the linear nature of DNN causes the vul-
nerability of DNN to adversarial examples. While FGSM
is an attack based on `∞ distance, [16] introduced an at-
tack under `0 distance known as Jacobian-based Saliency
Map Attack (JSMA). C&W attack [4] is introduced as an
attack which can be applied under `0, `2 and `∞ distances.
It is shown to significantly outperform FGSM and JSMA
under the corresponding distance metrics. Research by [21]
shows a surprising observation whereby adversarial training
with single step attack such as FGSM leads to a degenerate
global minimum. They resolved the issue by using attacks
crafted from different neural networks. PGD is the universal
first-order adversary [13], and a DNN model trained with
PGD is supposed to be robust to any first-order attack.
Our work is an extension of PGD. We replace the sign
gradient in each iteration of PGD with quantized gradients.
PQGD and BLOB QG belong to the category of white-box
attacks because it has access to the network parameters and
architecture, training data and its corresponding label.
Adversarial Training Adversarial training was first
introduced in [7] and [13] who formally define it through a
lens of modified empirical risk minimization (Eq. 1). Evi-
dence in [2] have shown that adversarial training is a state-
of-the-art approach to increase the robustness of a model
against adversarial examples.
Other Defenses Gradient masking is a defense that
causes the target network to generate corrupted gradients
[16]. Existing literatures including Thermometer Encoding
[3], Input Transformation [9], stochastic activation pruning
[5] Pre-Input Randomization Layer [24] PixelDefend [19],
and Defense Distillation [17] fall into this category. Re-
search by [2] shows that there are inherent limitations of
Perturbation PGD PQGD 100 PQGD 200 PQGD 500 PQGD 1000
8.0/255.0 45.31% 45.32% 45.32% 45.33% 45.57%
16.0/255.0 14.02% 14.24% 14.11% 13.98% 13.87%
Table 6. Performance Comparison of the adversarial trained Cifar10 model from Madry Lab with no restart under 100-step attack (with 8.0
and 16.0/255.0 `∞maximumallowedperturbations). PQGD 100 denotes PQGD with b = 100.
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Figure 3. Effect of Maximum Allowed Perturbation on the averaged accuracy of applying PQGD and PGD attacks on adversarial trained
models
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Figure 4. Effect of the number of steps on the averaged accuracy when applying PQGD and PGD attacks on adversarial trained models
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Figure 5. Effect of the number of steps on the accuracy of applying PQGD and PGD attacks on adversarial trained Cifar10 models under
different allowed perturbations
these approaches and these defenses can be bypassed using
more elaborated attack.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we revisit sign gradients, which are widely
used in the white-box attacks, e.g., FGSM, PGD and DAA-
BLOB. We argue that existing first-order attacks with sign
gradients discards the information of relative magnitude be-
tween components in the raw gradient and thus affects the
process of crafting effective adversarial examples. We pro-
pose quantized gradients to preserve the relative magnitude
between components of raw gradients and we integrate ex-
isting first order attacks with them. Experiments show that
iterative first order attacks with quantized gradients outper-
forms the attacks with sign gradients.
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